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Abstract
We propose conduct parameter based market power measures within a model of price discrim-
ination, extending work by Hazledine (2006) and Kutlu (2012) to certain forms of second degree
price discrimination. We use our model to estimate the market power of U.S. airlines in a price
discrimination environment. We nd that a slightly modied version of our original theoretical
measure is positively related with market concentration. Moreover, on average, market power
for high-end segment is greater than that of low-end segment.
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1 Introduction
The relationship between price discrimination and market power has been extensively
researched.1 In a theoretical setting, Dana (1999) shows that when capacity is costly and
prices are set in advance, rms facing uncertain demand will sell output at multiple prices.
As the market becomes more competitive, the prices become more dispersed. Hence, the
model of Dana (1999) supports a negative relationship between market power and price
dispersion. On the other hand, McAfee, Mialon, and Mialon (2006) nd no theoretical
connection between the strength of price discrimination and market power. Dai, Liu, and
Serfes (2014) show that the relationship between the unit transportation cost (intensity of
competition) and price dispersion (measured by the Gini coe¢ cient) is non-monotonic and
can be inverse U-shaped. As for the empirical literature, Borenstein and Rose (1994) and
Stavins (2001) nd a negative relationship between price dispersion and market power.
Gerardi and Shapiro (2009) show a positive relationship, while Dai, Liu, and Serfes (2014)2
and Chakrabarty and Kutlu (2014) show a non-monotonic relationship between market
power and price dispersion. These studies rely on the Herndahl-Hirschman Index (HHI)
as a proxy for market power when examining this relationship.3 It would seem, however,
that for these studies a term such as price dispersion would be more appropriate than
price discrimination. This is due to the need to control for the e¤ect of costs in order
to properly identify price discrimination, which these studies do not do as they utilize
reduced form regressions to estimate the degree of price discrimination instead of using
a structural empirical model.4 Structural models exist to address such matters. In this
1See Perlo¤, Karp, and Golan (2007) and Stole (2007) for extensive surveys on market power and
price discrimination, respectively.
2Dai, Liu, and Serfes (2014) study price dispersion both theoretically and empirically.
3The HHI is a measure of market concentration, with implications for market power under certain
circumstances.
4Price dispersion may happen for reasons other than cost di¤erences and market power. For example,
in a framework with identical rms (same marginal costs), Kutlu (2015) and Baris and Kutlu (2015) show
that if the consumers have limited memories even when each rm sets a single price, price dispersion may
exist.
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paper we estimate a structural model that is consistent with our theoretical model of
what Pigou calls second degree price discrimination, which approximates the rst degree
price discrimination by assuming a nite number of prices based on the willingness to pay
of customers.5
We propose market power measures that are specically designed to capture price dis-
crimination. Our measures are derived from a conduct parameter game where the rms
price discriminate.6 Hence, when rms price discriminate our measures are designed to
better identify the presence of market power compared with measures ignoring price dis-
crimination, such as HHI as a proxy for market power. By utilizing our conduct parameter
game, we can show that for a variety of sensible scenarios a positive relationship between
market power, measured by the conduct, and price discrimination is supported. Con-
duct is a supply related concept and is associated with the way rms play the game. By
saying conducts of high-end and low-end segmentswe di¤erentiate potentially di¤erent
conducts of rms that the rms implement for di¤erent consumer segments.
In the presence of price discrimination using a single-price index can lead to biased
estimation results. The rst estimation problem concerns the demand equation. In par-
ticular, the estimated price elasticity of demand would be biased and inconsistent if a
single-price index is used in demand estimation when rms price discriminate due to
model misspecication. As we will discuss later in Section 2, the source of the bias relates
to di¤erent interpretations of observed quantities in single-price and price discrimination
settings. The bias goes away as the market structure approaches perfect competition.
Consistent estimation of the price elasticity of demand is important for deriving con-
sistent conduct parameter estimates. A second estimation problem involves the supply
equation. While the single-price version of the conduct parameter game necessitates some
5For a discussion of the etymology of price discrimination and its degrees see Hazledine (2015).
6The equilibrium of this conduct parameter model is derived in Kutlu (2016).
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functional form assumptions on the marginal cost so as to identify the conduct parameter,
in the price discrimination framework we do not have to make any such assumptions if
conduct is invariant to price segment. The reason is that the price discrimination version
of the conduct model can be written in a form that does not require knowledge of mar-
ginal costs. However, the researcher must specify the high-end and low-end prices as well
as corresponding quantities. These prices and quantities can be obtained in an ad hoc
way or can be determined by econometric analysis.
We consider the U.S. airline industry in order to illustrate how our theoretical model
can be applied to measure the market power of rms who price discriminate. We es-
timate the market power of U.S. airlines under price discrimination settings during the
period 1999I to 2009IV . We nd that for almost all airlines in our sample the average
market power either remains more or less the same over the years or it decreases. On
average, market power for high-end segment is greater than that of low-end segment. We
also examined the relationship between market concentration (measured by HHI) and
market power. We nd that there is a positive relationship between market power and
concentration.
In the next section, we introduce our theoretical model and results. This is followed
by the empirical model and estimations, and nally our conclusions.
2 Theoretical Model
2.1 Supply Side
In this section, we introduce a conduct parameter model, which enables us to measure
market powers of rms in the price discrimination framework. There are N rms in the
market. Each consumer buys no more than one unit of the good. The distribution of
4
customer valuations is known to the rms and resale of the good is not possible. The
customers are segmented into bins based on their reservation prices. The price of the
good for the kth bin is given by:
Pk = P (
Xk
i=1
Qi) (1)
where qi;n is the quantity sold in bin i by rm n; Qk =
PN
n=1 qk;n is the total quantity
sold in the bin k = 1; 2; and P is an inverse demand function that represents consumers
valuations.7 In our empirical illustration the market is segmented into two bins (K = 2)
and we discuss our model using the two bin segmentation in the discussion to follow.
The total quantity demanded in the market is denoted by Q = Q1 + Q2. Hence, P1 =
P (Q1) and P2 = P (Q1 +Q2) = P (Q). Following earlier studies that use this demand
structure, we concentrate on the airline industry. The valuation of a buyer is a function
of characteristics of the ticket including the time of the purchase. The business travellers,
whose plans are often made with relatively minimal lead times and which tend to be
relatively inexible, have high valuations whereas the tourists, whose plans are generally
exible, have relatively low valuations. Hence, the airlines can optimally group the buyers
based on the day they want to buy a particular airline seat and the lead time in reserving
the seat.
In our conduct parameter model the consumer segmentation is optimal in the sense
that the size of each bin is determined by the rm. This contrasts with price discrimi-
nation models wherein each segment is taken to be exogenous to the rms so that each
segment is taken as a separate market. In a commonly used price discrimination scenario
we would have two separate markets determining each segment so that the demands of
consumers belonging to these segments are independent of each other. This sort of price
7Varian (1985) [Section I], Formby and Millner (1989), Hazledine (2006, 2010), Kumar and Kutlu
(2015), and Kutlu (2009, 2012, 2016) use this demand structure based on the valuations of consumers.
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discrimination may be reasonable were the segments xed, say by gender or race. Seg-
mentation by race is considered by Graddy (1995), among others, in her work on price
discrimination.
However, in a market where reservation prices depend on the age of customers, rms
could choose quantities indirectly by choosing a threshold age. In this setting, customers
who are older than the threshold age would be assigned to bin 1 and the rest assigned
to bin 2. The rm could then implicitly decrease the size of bin 1 by increasing the age
threshold. In the airline context, airlines can segment customers by choosing the number
of days before the ight. If the rms can adjust the segment size, then our model can
capture this behavior.
2.2 Demand Estimation
Demand estimation is an essential part of market power measurement and below we
examine how demand estimates are biased when price discrimination is ignored. As
Nash equilibrium is a special case of the conduct parameter setting, we illustrate the
problems in demand estimation using this special case. The qualitative results are the
same for the conduct parameter setting. As in the earlier section, assume that the rms
segment their customers based on their reservation prices. The researcher observes the
average price, P , rather than the demand function, P , representing the valuations of
customers. While for the single-price scenario there is no distinction between P and P ,
for the price discrimination scenario P and P are not the same. If the researcher assumes
that a single-price index, P , constitutes the demand function, then this would lead to a
systematic measurement error. We consider a linear inverse demand function:
P (Q) = + Q (2)
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where  < 0. The corresponding average price is:8
P (Q1; Q2) =
P1Q1 + P2Q2
Q1 +Q2
(3)
= P2 + (P1   P2) Q1
Q
= P (Q)  Q2Q1
Q
= + 

Q  Q1Q2
Q

= +  (1  s(1  s))Q
where s = Q1Q is the share of high-end customers. The relevant rst order conditions for
the conduct parameter setting, which is more general than a Cournot competition, is given
in the next section. To estimate this relationship the researcher would collect data for
total revenue, PQ, and total quantity, Q, in order to construct the dependent variable for
the demand function. The ( P ;Q) pair then would be viewed as constituting the demand
function and thus it would be assumed by the researcher that P (Q) = + Q, which of
course excludes the  Q1Q2Q term and thus coe¢ cient estimates for the demand function,
P (Q), are biased even when an instrumental variable approach is used. The reason for
the bias is the measurement error in an endogenous variable, which is correlated with the
instruments that are used.9 If the average price is calculated this way, it is unlikely that
the measurement error could be attenuated since standard instruments such as quantities
and prices from other similar markets and lagged values of quantities and prices would
likely be correlated with the measurement error, Q1Q2Q , by denition. The asymptotic
8Recall that P1 = P (Q1) is the high-end price, P2 = P (Q1 +Q2) is the low-end price, and Q =
Q1 +Q2 is the total quantity.
9Note that the reason for measurement error is not due to a measurement mistake that is done by
the researcher. It is rather due to using an incorrect model so that the variable used in the model di¤ers
from the one that should be used in the estimations.
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bias in  estimate is given by:
plim^ =  +
Cov (Z; u)
Cov (Z;Q)
(4)
=  +
Cov

Z; Q1Q2Q

Cov (Z;Q)
)
plim
 
^   
jj
!
=
Cov

Z; Q1Q2Q

Cov (Z;Q)
=
Cov (Z; s(1  s)Q)
Cov (Z;Q)
where u =  Q1Q2Q > 0 is the measurement error in the endogenous variable and Z is
the instrumental variable. In the (symmetric) Cournot game with price discrimination
equilibrium, s (1  s) = N
(N+1)2
. If we place this number into the above formula, we have:
plim
 
^   
jj
!
=
N
(N + 1)
2 > 0. (5)
Based on these arguments the bias most likely be positive, i.e., ^ > , and
^ < jj.
For perfectly competitive markets, as expected, the bias vanishes and for monopoly the
bias reaches its highest value in percentage of , i.e, 25%. For a linear demand scenario,
the bias falls below 5% only when the number of rms reaches 18 in this example.
We conclude that using a single-price index may seriously bias the estimates of de-
mand equation parameters. One of the consequences of estimating the demand elasticity
incorrectly may be awed market power estimates. Without the knowledge of  the
conduct parameter approach cannot identify market conduct. Similarly, if  is biased,
then conduct parameter estimates as a market power measure may be biased as well. In
the context of quantity competition, Hazledine (2006) and Kutlu (2012, 2016) note that
the average price paid is independent of the extent of price discrimination. At a rst
look, this may suggest that price discrimination may be ignored in empirical works by
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using average price as a price index. However, our results suggest that while the result
of Hazledine (2006) and Kutlu (2012, 2016) may be considered as a predictor of average
price in a price discrimination setting, this does not necessary imply that price discrimi-
nation can be ignored as this would lead to biased demand estimates. The intuition for
this puzzle is given as follows. In the price discrimination setting the total quantity and
revenue increases compared to single price setting. Hence, the total quantity sold and
thus recorded in any data set is the quantity that corresponds to the quantity sold in the
price discrimination setting, which is higher than its single setting counterpart. Hence,
if a researcher assumes a single price market and assumes that total quantity sold, Q,
is the relevant quantity for the single price (i.e., the quantity weighted average price),
then since the relevant quantity is lower this would lead to incorrect demand parame-
ter estimates. Basically, interpretation of the quantity must be adjusted if a single price
model is estimated and the true model is the price discrimination one. This is in line with
the nding of Hazledine (2006) and Kutlu (2012, 2016) though their result may easily
be misinterpreted as if the price discrimination may be ignored when estimating market
power and demand.
In the next section, we construct a market power measure in the price discrimination
framework that addresses this issue.
2.3 Market Power Estimation
We now consider a conduct parameter model in the price discrimination framework and
propose market power measures consistent with this model. Assume that rm n is choosing
quantities for each bin, (q1n; q2n). The optimization problem of the representative rm is
given by:
max
q1n;q2n
n = P1q1n + P2q2n   Cn(q1n + q2n) (6)
9
where Cn stands for the total cost of rm n. The rst order conditions are:
@n
@q1n
= P1 + P
0
1q1n
@Q1
@q1n
+ P 02q2n
@Q
@q1n
  cn(q1n + q2n) (7)
= P1 + P
0
1q1n + P
0
2q2n   cn(q1n + q2n) = 0
@n
@q2n
= P2 + P
0
2q2n
@Q
@q2n
  cn(q1n + q2n) (8)
= P2 + P
0
2q2n   cn(q1n + q2n) = 0
where cn stands for the marginal cost of rm n.10 After summing over n and rearranging
these rst order conditions, we have:
1
N
NX
n=1

@n
@q1n
  @n
@q2n

= P1   P2 + P 01Q1

N
= 0) (9)
P1   P2 =  P 01Q1
where  = N represents the market power. The conducts  =

0; 1N ; 1
	
correspond
to perfect competition, price discriminating (symmetric) Cournot competition, and price
discriminating monopoly (joint prot maximization), respectively. When  = 0, as perfect
competition suggests, there is only one price and this price is equal to the marginal cost.
We consider only the rms optimization problem with respect to a particular route
and do not consider the complications inherent in modeling the decision to optimize with
respect to all of its and its competitors routes. For example, the number of directional
routes in our data sets is 1153. This is consistent with a large body of theoretical and
empirical work on the airline industry that assumes independence of city-pair markets.
10For the single price setting Puller (2009) argues that if the rms play a dynamic game, including
time-dummies can handle potential estimation problems that lead to inconsistent parameter estimation.
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Given that the segment sizes are determined by the rms, the common conduct as-
sumption for high-end and low-end segments seems to be a relatively sensible assumption
for our homogenous product setting. Note that although the high-end and low-end seg-
ments would likely have di¤erent demand elasticities, which a¤ects the price-marginal
cost markups, this di¤erence does not necessarily imply distinct conducts.
The Equation (9) can be generalized to a setting where there are more than two prices.
The generalized version of this equation is
Pj   Pj+1 =  P 0jQj (10)
for j = 1; 2; :::;K   1, where K is the number of prices and Qj is the total quantity for
segment j. Then, for the K price scenario, the conduct can be written as:
 = "j
Pj   Pj+1
Pj
(11)
where j =   1P 0j
Pj
Qj
is the price elasticity of demand for segment j.11 The conduct
parameter game that we consider assumes a single conduct for all price segments, which
is derived from a conjectural variations game. If one is willing to consider conduct as an
index for market power, we even can extend our market power index to allow di¤erent
values for di¤erent segments:
j = "j
Pj   Pj+1
Pj
(12)
where j is the market power for segment j. This equation allows us to compare the
market powers of rms for di¤erent price segments. In what follows, we concentrate on
the case where the number of price segments is two.
11To be more precise this is the absolute value of the price elasticity of demand, which we use
throughout.
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Bresnahan (1989) argues that one should consider  as a parameter that can take
values consistent with existing theories. If the researcher considers  as a parameter
coming from several theories, the estimated parameter value can be used to categorize
the market using statistical tests. For example, one can test whether the market outcome
is consistent with symmetric Cournot competition or not by testing  = 1N . Another
approach is considering  as a continuous-valued parameter. An interpretation of this
approach is that the conduct is described in terms of rmsconjectural variations, which
are the expectationsabout other rmsreactions. This interpretation allows  to take a
continuum of values. The important point in this interpretation is that the conjectures
do not refer to what rms believe will happen if they change their quantity levels. In the
conjectural variations language, what is being estimated is what rms do as a result of
their expectations. As Corts (1999) mentions the conduct parameter can be estimated
as ifthe rms are playing a conjectural variations game that would give the observed
price-cost margins. We consider  as a market power index that can take a continuum of
values and measures the size of the elasticity adjusted price cost markup. For instance,
we may interpret a market with  value between 0 and 1N as a market level that is more
competitive than a symmetric Cournot competition.
We dene price discrimination as:
PD = P1   P2. (13)
Hence, the conduct parameter is given by:
 =
P1   P2
 P 01Q1
(14)
= 1
PD
P1
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where 1 =   1P 01
P1
Q1
. Our price discrimination measure is reminiscent of the price-marginal
cost markup for the Lerner index:
L =
P  MC
P
(15)
where MC is the marginal costfor the market. Generally MC is dened as a weighted
average of the marginal costs of the rms in the market. For the single-price conduct
parameter game, the conduct parameter is nothing more than the elasticity adjusted
Lerner index:
~ = L (16)
where  =   1P 0 PQ is the price elasticity of demand. The price-cost markup takes a central
role for the Lerner index. In our case, the relevant markup is P1 P2 and the counterpart
of Lerner index is P1 P2P1 , which may be considered as an alternative for Lerner index in
the context of price discrimination. An important implication of this is that marginal
cost information is not required. In the single-price conduct parameter setting the rms
determine the price in such a way that the equilibrium price lies above the marginal
cost. Hence, the optimal price lies somewhere at or above the marginal cost. In the price
discrimination setting, the rms choose quantities for low-end and high-end segments and
these quantities determine the prices for these segments. In our model, if the price of the
low-end segment, P2, were a function of Q1 so that Q2 is xed (i.e., Q2 is given) and
the rms choose high-end market quantities, then their optimal choice (conditional on
Q2) would be to choose Q1 treating P2 as if it is the marginal cost. This is because
in reality P2 is the e¤ective opportunity cost for the high-end market pricing option.
Similar to the standard single-price setting, for a given Q2 level, the optimal P1 value
lies somewhere at or above this e¤ective (marginal) opportunity cost, i.e., P2.12 The
12Here, by optimal P1 for a given Q2, we mean the equilibrium for the conduct parameter game when
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derivation of our market power measure is based on this idea that, for any given low-
end quantity, the choice of high-end quantity is determined so that the low-end price
represents the e¤ective (marginal) opportunity cost.
Identication is an important issue in the conduct parameter approach and the con-
stant marginal cost assumption is widely used in order to overcome this di¢ culty.13 Since
we do not need cost information, we need not make functional form assumptions on the
cost function. However, we do require data for group specic prices and have to assume
a single conduct for all price segments. If the indices are constructed from ticket specic
price data, the researcher must either identify the group to which each individual pas-
senger belongs or divide the sample based on some characteristics of the customers. For
example, in case of movie theaters this criteria can be based on the age of customers. In
case of airlines, the segmentation can be based on length of time between the ight and
purchase of ticket. However, such information can be hard for the researcher to acquire.
An indirect way to segment the customers might be to use information on ticket char-
acteristics. An alternative solution is using the counterpart of Lerner index, i.e., P1 P2P1 ,
for the price discrimination setting. For example, for P1 and P2 maybe chosen as specic
percentiles of prices such as 80th and 20th percentile prices.
We utilize Equation (14) to examine the relationship between price discrimination and
market power. The derivative of price discrimination with respect to conduct is given by:
@PD
@
=

1
~1
2
(~1   ~1) > 0, (17)
~1 > ~1
where ~1 = 1P1 and ~1 =
@~1
@ . The conduct would be changing ~1 through its e¤ect
Q2 is treated as given.
13For more details about identication in the framework of conduct parameter approach see Bresnahan
(1982), Lau (1982), Perlo¤, Karp, and Golan (2007), and Perlo¤ and Shen (2012).
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on the equilibrium quantities and prices. If ~1 is relatively non-responsive to changes in
conduct and market power is relatively low, then price discrimination is likely to increase
as market power increases. An example of a positive correlation between PD and  is a
situation in which the inverse demand function is in lin-log form as this would imply that
~1 > 0 is a constant. Two less obvious examples of a positive relationship are situations
in which the inverse demand function is in lin-lin or log-lin form.14 Hence, for a variety of
demand function scenarios, price discrimination and market power are positively related.
3 An Empirical Illustration to Analyze U.S. Airline Industry
In this section, we illustrate our methodology for estimating market powers of rms in
the price discrimination framework. We estimate the market powers of the U.S. airlines
utilizing our conduct parameter framework and compare then with the market concen-
tration measure. First, we introduce our data set. Then, we present our empirical model
and results.
3.1 Data
Our quarterly data set covers a sample of airline tickets from reporting carriers over the
period from 1999I to 2009IV . The U.S. airlines faced serious nancial troubles during
this period. Historically, the demand for the U.S. airline industry grew steadily. However
in our sample period there were exceptions to this pattern. The e¤ect of these negative
shocks is boosted by sticky labor prices and exogenous cost shocks such as increased
taxes and jet fuel prices. The nancial implications of these factors on domestic airline
14For the log-lin demand form we assumed zero marginal cost for the sake of getting a closed form
solution for the equilibrium. Similarly, for the lin-lin demand functional form we assume that marginal
costs are constant.
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operations were starkthe airlines lost an order of magnitude more (in 2009 dollars)
during our sample period, the decade of 1999  2009 compared to the entire previous two
decades of 1979  1999.15
Our data set is compiled from a variety of data sources. Price indices are constructed
from the Airline Origin and Destination Survey (DB1B) data provided by the Bureau of
Transportation Statistics. The DB1B is a 10% sample of airline tickets from reporting
carriers collected by the O¢ ce of Airline Information of the Bureau of Transportation
Statistics. Information on the number of enplanements is obtained from the T100 data-
base. We concentrate on direct one-way or round-trip itineraries. The round-trip fares are
divided by two in order to derive corresponding one-way fares.16 Two di¤erent groups of
prices and quantities are calculated. The low-end group price is taken as 20th percentile
price for a given airline and quarter. The high-end group price is taken as 80th percentile
price for a given airline and quarter. We use the 5th percentile of prices for a given airline
and quarter as a proxy for marginal cost, MC. The price percentiles are calculated using
airline specic data so that the dispersion does not reect inter-airline price di¤erences,
which would be otherwise lead to a deceptive measure for market power. When the price
dispersion, PD, is based on a limited number of ticket specic observations or when routes
had a very small number of passengers (i.e., 1000 passengers a quarter, which means 100
data points to calculate price percentiles) the observations were dropped. Top and bottom
1% of the price dispersion measure, PD, is dropped to avoid outliers. As a robustness
check we also estimate the same model without dropping limited number of ticket specic
observations and top-bottom 1% of PD. Finally, outliers, such as observations based on
itineraries with incrediblefare data according to the variable DollarCredare dropped
as well.
15For more information about the nancial situations of the U.S. airlines, see Borenstein (2011) and
Duygun, Kutlu, and Sickles (2016).
16Borenstein and Rose (1994) divide the round-trip price by 2.
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When calculating prices multi-destination tickets are excluded because it is not pos-
sible to identify the tickets origin and destination. Also, following Bruecker, Dyer, and
Spiller (1992) we excluded any ticket that does not have the same fare class for all seg-
ments of the trip. One potential issue is that coach class tickets are not always consistently
reported across carriers. For example, our ticket level raw data set includes some small
carriers that designate all their tickets as only rst class and business class. We consider
the quality for these tickets as coach class. This may cause a downwards bias in our
price discrimination measure. However, similarly, dropping such airlines may cause some
upwards bias in the price discrimination measure. In any case, the share of such airlines
is small. Finally, sometimes the class information for a ticket is not available and we drop
such tickets.
Our data set also includes city specic demographic variables such as population
weighted per capita income (PCI) and the average population for each city-pair (POP )
based on Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA) data from the U.S. Census. As the MSA
data are annual, interpolations were used to generate quarterly versions of the PCI and
POP variables. When merging the MSA data with the airline data, we lost some cities
as we had Census information on just the metropolitan areas.
The nal database contains 1153 directional routes. We deated nominal prices by
the CPI. The rst quarter of 2005 is the base quarter. Our data set includes information
about ight distance (DIST ) between of city-pairs and the average size (SIZE) of the
eets. The larger sized eets can help airlines provide more services without a proportional
increase in costs. Also, larger aircraft are generally perceived as safer and thus improves
service quality. On the other hand, larger aircraft carry more people, which might cause
congestion, increase the possibility that luggage is mishandled, and increase waiting time
for baggage claims. Therefore, the net quality e¤ect of aircraft size is ambiguous. Flight
distance is one of the more important determinants of ight cost. It also captures the
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indirect competition e¤ects from other modes of transportation. Finally, the (logarithm
of) quantity for the industry (QOTH), which is calculated using the quantities in other
route markets is used as an instrument. Table 1 provides a summary statistics for the
primary data used in the study i.e., data after dropping outliers. In the table, the route
specic quantity is denoted by Q.
Table 1 is about here
3.2 Empirical Model
In the theoretical section, we considered a model that shows how a market specic conduct
can be estimated. In order to estimate the demand equation and the conduct parameters
we must assign customers to segments. We divide customers into two groups: high-end
and low-end (bin 1 and bin 2, respectively). We take the high-end segment price as 80th
percentile of prices, P1, for a given route, time, and airline. The low-end segment price
is assumed to be 20th percentile of prices, P2, for a given route, time, and airline. Based
on this assumption we do not know the corresponding market quantities. We assume
that the market quantity for high-end segment, Q1, is a constant multiple of total market
quantity, Q, so that Q1 = krtQ, where krt is route and time specic constant. The
practical implication of this assumption is that in our demand estimations the logarithm
of Q can be replaced by the logarithm of Q1 as long as we include route and time specic
dummy variables in the demand model.17 Hence, for the demand estimation we simply
replace Q1 by Q.
17Note that since prices are calculated based on the percentile prices, the number of tickets with price
above P1 and P2 would satisfy the constant fraction assumption.
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We specify the inverse demand function in log-log form as follows:
lnP1;rti = 0 + 1 lnQ1rt + 2 lnQ1rt lnDISTr +
X
j>2
jXrti + "rti (18)
where P1;rti is the 80th percentile price for route r, time t , and airline i; Q1rt is the
high-end segment quantity for route r and time t; Xrti are the control variables; and "rti
is the error term. Based on Equation (14) our route-time-airline specic market power
measure can be calculated by:
 = 1
P1   P2
P1
=
P1   P2
(1 + 2 lnDISTr)P1
. (19)
Ideally, if we knew which tickets are served as high-end and low-end in the data set, the 
values would lie in the theoretical boundaries provided in the Market Power Estimation
section. However,  does not necessarily lie in the unit interval. The reason is that our
high-end and low-end price choices does not necessarily coincide with the theoretical high-
end and low-end prices. However, since P1 and P2 are chosen from the same percentiles
(i.e., 80th and 20th) for all routes-time-airline triples,  values may be useful to analyze
relativemarket powers for airline markets.
Table 2 provides the demand estimates from 2SLS estimation.18 As a robustness check,
in the third column, we weighted observations by the average number of passengers for
each route-carrier pair over the sample.19 As we mentioned above, since the inverse de-
mand function is in log-log form and the route and time dummies are included in the
estimations, we can replace Q1 by Q in the model. The instruments include the explana-
tory variables of the model, (logarithm) of total quantities for the industry (excluding the
18The Benchmark estimates are based on smaller number of observations than we present in the de-
scriptive statistics table. This is due to the lagged instruments that we use in the estimations. The Keep
Outlier PD estimates are based on more obsevations as this dataset keeps the outlier values.
19See Goolsbee and Syverson (2008) for a study that is using these weights.
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relevant carriers route quantity), and lagged values of lnQrt and lnQrt lnDISTr. The
quantity for the industry instrument is based on the quantities in other route markets.
The quantity for a market and sum of all quantities for the other markets are assumed
to be independent. A similar set of instruments were used in Kutlu and Sickles (2012).
Under-identication and weak identication are rejected at any conventional signicance
levels. The F statistic of excluded instruments is given by F (3; 92172) = 32081. While
Sargans test for over-identication fails, it is unclear whether the large number of obser-
vations is the reason for the rejection. As argued by Nevo (2001), it is well known that
with a large enough sample such tests will be rejected by essentially any model. Moreover,
when we only use the lagged values of endogenous variables as instruments, so that we
have exact identication, the conduct estimates from this model have a correlation of 1
with the conduct estimates from the benchmark model.
Table 2 is about here
The 5th, 50th, and 95th percentiles of price elasticity estimates are 1:77, 2:06, and
2:41, respectively. Moreover, the minimum, maximum, and mean values for elasticities
are 1:67, 2:84, and 2:07, respectively. Hence, the elasticity and slope of demand have
correct signs for all sample observations. Moreover, as expected, the median demand
elasticity for short distance ights (distance below 50th percentile) is smaller than that
of long distance ights (distance above 50th percentile), i.e., 1:93 and 2:21, respectively.
Both Pearson and Spearman correlations of  estimates from benchmark and weighted
models are 0:94. Hence, the market power estimates are similar.
In their meta study for airline price elasticities, Brons et. at (2002) nd that mean
and standard deviation of price elasticity estimates, based on 204 di¤erent studies, are
1:15 and 0:62. The highest price elasticity value in their meta study is 3:20. This suggests
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that our price elasticity estimates are reasonable. The 5th, 50th, and 95th percentiles of
 estimates are 0:59, 0:95, and 1:46, respectively.20 The mean and standard deviation
for  estimates are 0:97 and 0:26, respectively. As mentioned above  does not lie in the
theoretical bounds as it is not constructed from the theoretical quantity and price values.
However, it still provides us some useful information about the relative market powers of
airlines. Figure 1 provides the carrier specic average  estimates over time. Since route
specic market power is heterogeneous there are variations in the  estimates. Hence, in
order to provide more information about the distributions of  estimates, we also provide
10th and 90th percentiles for the  estimates. The tted values in the gure are obtained
from regressing the  values on time. As it can be seen, in general, the market powers of
airlines either remained relatively constant or decreased.
Figure 1 is about here
One relevant question is whether our market power measure has a positive relationship
between market concentration. For this purpose, we regress our  estimates on route-
time specic HHI values, lnPOP , lnPCI, lnSIZE, time dummies, and route-airline
dummies. Since HHI may potentially be endogenous, we estimate two models. In the
rst one we assume that HHI is exogenous and in the second one we assume that HHI
is endogenous and instrument HHI by its lagged values. For both cases the coe¢ cient
estimates for HHI variable are positive and signicant at any conventional signicance
level. The estimation results are given in Table 3.
Table 3 is about here
20The 5th, 50th, and 95th percentiles of  estimates for the dataset that keeps outliers for PD are 0:45,
0:99, and 1:72.
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So far, in line with our conduct parameter model, we assumed that the market powers
of high-end and low-end segments are the same. It is worth to explore whether this is a
sensible assumption by using our general market power index given in Equation (12). We
already calculated the market power index for the high-end segment, i.e., 1 = . The
market power index for the low-end segment is:
2 = 2
P2  MC
P2
where 2 is the price elasticity for low-end segment as dened earlier, P2 is the low-end
segment price, and MC is the marginal cost, which is proxied by the 5th percentile of
prices. The comparison of market power estimates for high-end and low-end segments
and single-price scenario is given in Table 4.
Table 4 is about here
A mean equality test concludes that 1 > 2 for any conventional signicance level.21
Since our empirical version of the conduct is a relative measure, in Table 4 we show the
Spearman correlations of conduct estimates with high-end and low-end estimates. Inter-
estingly, the low-end and high-end markets have a very low (yet statistically signicant)
Spearman correlation. This result illustrates how di¤erently these markets can behave.
Relatively low Spearman correlation between price discrimination and single-price con-
duct estimates shows that using a single-price index may be deceptive.
21We would still get 1 > 2 at any conventional signicance level if we proxy MC by the average of
all prices below 5th percentile of prices. For this scenario, the median and mean for 2 estimates are 0:66
and 0:71, respectively.
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The carrier specic market power estimates for the low-end segment are provided in
Figure 2. Our qualitative results for the relationship between 2 and HHI are the same
as what we found for  = 1, i.e., for both exogenous and endogenous HHI scenarios the
relationship is positive at any conventional signicance levels.
Figure 2 is about here
4 Conclusion
In many industries price discrimination is prevalent yet often mergers are analyzed in
a single-price framework. If antitrust authorities ignore price discrimination, then they
may end up blocking socially benecial mergers or accepting socially harmful mergers.
A conduct parameter measure of market power specic for the price discrimination envi-
ronment can potentially prevent such suboptimal decisions. For this purpose we designed
a conduct parameter model that enables estimation of market power in the presence of
price discrimination. Like many other market power measures our measure is static. In
dynamic environments, this might result in inconsistent parameter estimates. This is
a general criticism for concentration measures, such as HHI, the Lerner index, and in
conduct parameter models.22 A possible solution would be to extend our model to a
framework such as that in the single-price model of Kutlu and Sickles (2012) so that the
rms play a dynamic e¢ cient super-game. However, such an extension is beyond the
scope of this paper.
An important aspect of our model is that it enables us to examine the relationship
between price discrimination and market power. For this purpose we used a variety of
22See Corts (1999) for a criticism of static conduct parameter models.
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(widely used) functional forms that lead to a closed form solution for the equilibrium.
For all of these scenarios there is a positive relationship between market power and price
discrimination. Hence, while we do not have compelling theoretical evidence for such a
positive relationship, it appears that for many of the sensible scenarios a positive rela-
tionship is likely to hold.
Our empirical example illustrated how our methodology for the estimating market
power of rms in the price discrimination framework can be applied by estimating the
market power of U.S. airlines. Our illustrative empirical model serves as an example
for how a price discrimination model can be estimated in our framework. Although our
data does not allow us to precisely categorize the price groups and we partially solve
this problem by using specic percentiles of prices. We overcame estimation problems
for demand function by choosing the log-log demand form and including airline-route
and time specic dummy variables. It turns out market power for the high-end segment,
on average, is greater than that of the low-end segment. Moreover, we conclude that
using a single-price conduct measure may be deceptive due to low Spearman correlation
between price discrimination and single-price conduct estimates. In general, the market
powers of US airlines did not increase over time, i.e., they either remained relatively
stable or decreased. We also showed that market concentration is directly related with
the market power. Other empirical settings and other data sources may provide such
precise categories while many, such as ours, may not and we have developed a method to
analyze price discrimination in both scenarios.
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